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ELIMINATING SEX DISCRIMINATION IN EDUCATIONAL
INSTITUTIONS: DOES TITLE IX REACH EMPLOYMENT?
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 19721 was among
the many remedial measures enacted by the Ninety-second Congress
to address congressional concerns about gender-based discrimina-
tion.2 Title IX prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex in
educational programs or activities receiving federal financial as-
sistance.3 Each agency distributing educational funds is "authorized
and directed" to promulgate rules and regulations ensuring that
federal aid recipients comply with the congressional mandate.4 The
ultimate sanction for noncompliance is the termination of federal
education funds available to the institution. 5
Because most educational programs are administered by the
Department of Education (ED),6 attention thus far has been focused
'Pub. L. No. 92-318, 86 Stat. 373 (codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1686
(1976)).
2 See, e.g., Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261,
86 Stat. 103 (codified in scattered sections of 5, 42 U.S.C.) (strengthening, inter
alia, title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17
(1976, Supp. I 1977 & Supp. II 1978)); State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act of
1972, Pub. L. No. 92-512, § 122, 86 Stat. 919 (codified at 31 U.S.C. § 1242 (1976))
(prohibiting sex discrimination in programs financed by revenue sharing funds);
Economic Opportunity Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-424, § 23, 86 Stat.
688 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §2971c (1976)) (prohibiting sex discrimination in
programs financed by the Office of Economic Opportunity); Equal Rights Amend-
ment, H.R.J. Res. 208, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 86 Stat. 1523 (1972).
a20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1976). For a more complete discussion of the statu-
tory language, including the many exceptions following the general prohibition,
see notes 23-42 infra & accompanying text. See generally Comment, Implementing
Title IX: The HEW Regulations, 124 U. PA. L. REv. 806, 807-18 (1976).
4 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1976).
5 Compliance with any requirement adopted pursuant to this section may
be effected (1) by the termination of or refusal to grant or to continue
assistance under such program or activity to any recipient as to whom
there has been an express finding on the record, after opportunity for
hearing, of a failure to comply with such requirement, but such termina-
tion or refusal shall be limited to the particular political entity, or part
thereof, or other recipient as to whom such a finding has been made,
and shall be limited in its effect to the particular program, or part thereof,
in which such noncompliance has been so found ....
Id.
OThe Department of Education (ED) was created by the Department of
Education Organization Act, Pub. L. No. 96-88, 93 Stat. 668 (codified at 20
U.S.C. §§ 3401-3510 (Supp. III 1979)). Education-related compliance efforts,
including title IX enforcement, were formerly handled by the Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW). 20 U.S.C. §3441(a)(3) (Supp. III
1979). See [1979] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1514, 1549-52. This Comment
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on the ED regulations implementing the title IX prohibition.7
These regulations, resting upon a broad interpretation of title IX,
proscribe sex discrimination against both students and employees of
educational institutions.3 Although it is unclear whether such em-
ployment regulations are within the authority granted ED by Con-
gress, there was little opposition to the proposed regulations when
they were issued in 1975. 9 ED's authority to regulate employment
discrimination under title IX was challenged briefly during con-
will refer to ED and its regulations as the relevant authorities, although the regula-
tions were originally promulgated by HEW, see note 9 infra, and ED has only
been functioning since May 4, 1980. Exec. Order No. 12,212, 45 Fed. Reg.
29,557 (1980).
734 C.F.R. § 106 (1980).
At least two other agencies have issued regulations to effectuate the purposes
of title IX. Department of Agriculture (USDA) regulations, for example, prohibit
sex discrimination in educational programs assisted by USDA funds. 7 C.F.R.
§ 15a (1980). The Small Business Administration has also used title IX as par-
tial authority for regulations requiring nondiscrimination in its financial assistance
programs. 13 C.F.R. § 113 (1980).
8 See 34 C.F.R. § 106, Subpart C (discrimination in admission and recruit-
ment); Subpart D (discrimination in education programs and activities); Subpart
E (discrimination in employment in educational programs and activities) (1980).
As already noted, see note 7 supra, the Department of Agriculture (USDA)
has also promulgated title IX regulations. They, too, reach employment discrimina-
tion. 7 C.F.R. § 15a, Subpart E (1980). These employment regulations have
never been challenged by the affected institutions; nor has their enforcement ever
been a major priority, though they may have been used in some complaint reviews
or compliance agreements that have not gone through the general counsel's office.
Telephone interview with Lonnie C. Rich, Office of General Counsel, USDA
(September 15, 1980). At least part of this underutilization can be explained
by the prior existence of sex discrimination regulations reaching employment prac-
tices, 7 C.F.R. § 18 (1980), promulgated under the Smith-Lever Act, 7 U.S.C.
§§ 341-349 (1976) (authorizing USDA's cooperative extension work program).
9 Title IX was signed into law by the President on June 23, 1972. Educa-
tion Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318, 86 Stat. 235, 381 (codified in
scattered sections of 7, 12, 16, 20, 29, 42 U.S.C.). The regulations were issued
in proposed form by HEW on June 20, 1974. 39 Fed. Reg. 22,228 (1974).
Former HEW Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger explained the two-year delay by
noting that the 37-word prohibitory language of the statute had to be translated
into specific and comprehensive regulations addressing many major policy issues;
that all HEW had to work from was a "very muddy congressional intent"; and
that various avenues for interest-group participation had to be provided. Sex
Discrimination Regulations: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Postsecondary Edu-
cation of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 437-38,
460 (1975) (testimony of HEW Secretary Weinberger) [hereinafter cited as
1975 Hearings]. After an extended period of public participation during which
the agency received over 9,700 written comments, final regulations were issued in
June 1975. 40 Fed. Reg. 24,128-45 (1975) (codified at 45 C.F.R. § 86 (1979)).
According to an HEW official, not one of the written comments forwarded to the
agency suggested that Congress did not intend to cover employment under title
IX. See 1975 Hearings, supra, at 479 (testimony of Peter Holmes). The regula-
tions became effective on July 21, 1975, more than a year after they were issued
in proposed form. 40 Fed. Reg. 24, 128 (1975). After the Department of
Education began functioning, see note 6 supra, it issued identical regulations. 34
C.F.R. § 106 (1980).
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gressional hearings examining the final regulations,10 but Congress
did not take any formal action,"1 and the regulations took effect
without modification. Since 1975, however, a few members of
Congress' 2 and several affected educational institutions 13 have
questioned whether Congress intended the general prohibition of
sex discrimination in title IX to encompass the employment prac-
tices of educational institutions. No definitive answer to this ques-
tion has been provided by Congress or the courts.14
Until recently, all federal courts considering the validity of
ED's employment regulations, including the Ninth Circuit decision
in Seattle University v. HEW,15 held that ED exceeded its statutory
authority by issuing title IX regulations reaching employment dis-
crimination. Each of these courts concluded that neither the plain
language of the statute nor the legislative history of title IX sup-
ports ED's contention that it has the authority to regulate employ-
ment at educational institutions.16 These decisions have severely
limited ED's enforcement program under title IX.1
' 0 See 1975 Hearings, supra note 9, at 406-08 (statement of Janet L. Kuhn).
Ms. Kuhn later formalized her understanding of congressional intentions in Kuhn,
Title IX: Employment and Athletics are Outside HEW's Jurisdiction, 65 GEo.
L.J. 49 (1976).
11This congressional inaction does not constitute approval of the regulations.
See notes 84-99 infra & accompanying text.
12 See notes 101-02 infra & accompanying text.
L3 See, e.g., cases cited in note 15 infra.
14 The Supreme Court recently agreed to resolve the issue. Seattle Univ. v.
HEW, 621 F.2d 992 (9th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. granted sub nom. United
States Dep't of Educ. v. Seattle Univ., 49 U.S.L.W. 3409 (U.S. Dec. 1, 1980)
(No. 80-493).
15621 F.2d 992 (9th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. granted sub nom. United
States Dep't of Educ. v. Seattle Univ., 49 U.S.L.W. 3409 (U.S. Dec. 1, 1980)
(No. 80-493); accord, Romeo Community Schools v. HEW, 600 F.2d 581 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979); Junior College Dist. v. Califano, 597
F.2d 119 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979); Islesboro School Comm. v.
Califano, 593 F.2d 424 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979); Grove City
College v. Harris, No. 78-1293 (W.D. Pa. June 26, 1980); Kneeland v. Bloom
Township High School Dist., 484 F. Supp. 1280 (N.D. Il. 1980); Sobel v.
Yeshiva Univ., 477 F. Supp. 1161 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Auburn School Dist. v. HEW,
19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1504 (D.N.H. 1979), appeal dismissed, No. 79-1261
(1st Cir. 1980); Board of Educ. v. HEW, 19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 457 (N.D.
Ohio 1979); University of Toledo v. HEW, 464 F. Supp. 693 (N.D. Ohio 1979);
McCarthy v. Burkholder, 448 F. Supp. 41 (D. Kan. 1978). See also Kuhn, supra
note 10, at 50-62; Note, Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972: Issues
Reach the Courts, 18 WAsHBuRN L.J. 310, 317-19 (1979).
16 The federal district court opinion in Romeo Community Schools v. HEW,
438 F. Supp. 1021 (E.D. Mich. 1977), aft'd, 600 F.2d 581 (6th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979), and the First Circuit opinion in Islesboro School
Comm. v. Califano, 593 F.2d 424 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979),
provide the most comprehensive justifications for this view and have been sub-
stantially relied on by other courts.
17The Office for Civil Rights (OCR) has suspended normal enforcement
of its employment regulations, and has instructed ED regional offices to proceed
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The Second and Fifth Circuits, however, recently refused to
follow this otherwise unanimous authority. In North Haven Board
of Education v. Hufstedler,18 the Second Circuit, after an exhaustive
examination of the statutory language and the legislative history,
concluded that Congress did intend to reach the employment prac-
tices of educational institutions under title IX. ED's employment
regulations were thus valid and enforceable. In Dougherty County
School System v. Harris,9 a much briefer opinion issued just four
days after the North Haven decision, the Fifth Circuit adopted a
middle ground. Recognizing that the current regulations apply to
all employees of an educational system as long as any program or
activity in the system receives federal assistance, the three-judge
panel decided that ED exceeded its statutory authority when it
issued these general regulations. The Court did not adopt, how-
ever, the majority view that ED can regulate only student-related
sex discrimination. Rather, it suggested that regulations "limited
to employees whose compensation is defrayed in whole or in part
by federal assistance or even to those who work in programs receiv-
ing federal aid or with students who are federally assisted" may
properly be within the scope of title IX.2°
only in limited cases. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court
of Appeals for the First Circuit, at 12 & n.9, Islesboro School Comm. v. Califano,
593 F.2d 424 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979). In June 1979, 507
(55.6%) of the 912 title IX cases pending before OCR concerned alleged employ-
ment discrimination. ED was prevented from acting on many of these complaints
because they emanated from those judicial districts in which the regulations had
been invalidated. Id. 11. As of September 1980, 158 (30.4%) of the 519 pending
title IX cases concerned employment discrimination; their enforcement was sim-
ilarly hindered. Telephone FOIA Request, see 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976 & Supp. II
1978), from OCR, Office of Planning and Compliance Operations, Analysis and
Evaluation Division, Reports and Analysis Branch (October 6, 1980). Cases in
which federal funds directly support employees, see note 28 infra, or where ED's
"infection theory" is applicable, see note 111 infra, are still being processed.
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit, supra, at 12 & n.9.
18629 F.2d 773 (2d Cir. 1980); accord, Piascik v. Cleveland Museum of
Art, 426 F. Supp. 779 (N.D. Ohio 1976) (dictum). Piascik was the first court
opinion to discuss title IX's application to employment discrimination, albeit in a
lengthy footnote concerned with another issue. While discussing whether to imply
a private right of action for vindicating violations of title IX, the court noted that
"[s~ection 1681(a), and the legislative history supporting it, express a powerful
Congressional intent to eradicate sex discrimination in non-religious, non-military,
co-educational programs, including, but certainly not limited to sex discrimina-
tion in employment in educational activities." 426 F. Supp. at 780, 781 n.1 (em-
phasis added). Subsequent court opinions have given little weight to this dictum.
See, e.g., Islesboro School Comm. v. Califano, 593 F.2d 424, 429 (1st Cir.) (court
unconvinced that Piascik "stands squarely for the proposition" that title IX covers
employment, and even if it does, it is "unpersuasive"), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 972
(1979).
19 622 F.2d 735 (5th Cir. 1980).
20 Id. 736; see id. 737-38.
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The courts' different conclusions regarding the validity of ED's
employment regulations have resulted from their different assump-
tions about, and descriptions of, the language and legislative history
of title IX. Parts I and II of this Comment examine these differ-
ences and demonstrate that they are indicative of the general un-
certainty surrounding title IX's employment coverage. The Com-
ment argues that, although the plain language of tide IX and the
legislative debate preceding its enactment suggest that employees
are indeed covered under the title IX umbrella, they are ultimately
inconclusive in resolving whether Congress intended to authorize
ED's employment regulations. It is necessary, therefore, to examine
the congressional purposes underlying title IX.21 This examination,
in part III of the Comment, demonstrates that Congress did intend
to provide another sanction for employment discrimination in edu-
cational institutions when it enacted title IX; ED's employment
regulations therefore should be held valid and enforceable.22
I. THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF TITLE IX
A. The General Prohibition
Section 1681(a) of title IX provides that "[n]o person in the
United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participa-
tion in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination
21 The courts have previously examined these purposes in only a cursory
fashion. See, e.g., North Haven Bd. of Educ., 629 F.2d at 785; Romeo Community
Schools v. HEW, 438 F. Supp. 1021, 1032-34 (E.D. Mich. 1977), aff'd, 600
F.2d 581 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979).
22The employment issue is but one of several questions that have been raised
concerning the scope and enforcement of title IX. Much has been written, for
example, about title IX's impact on intercollegiate athletics. See, e.g., Cox, Inter-
collegiate Athletics and Title IX, 46 Gro. WAsr. L. REv. 34 (1977); Note, Sex
Discrimination and Intercollegiate Athletics: Putting Some Muscle on Title IX, 88
YALE LJ. 1254 (1979) [hereinafter cited as YALE Note]. Another area of con-
tention concerns whether Congress intended a private right of action under title
IX. This question was recently answered in the affirmative by the Supreme Court.
Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979). See, e.g., Comment,
A Private Right of Action Under Title IX: Cannon v. University of Chicago, 57
DEN. L.J. 437 (1980); Note, Title IX: No Longer an Empty Promise-Cannon v.
University of Chicago, 29 DE PAuL L. REv. 263 (1979); Comment, Implication of
a Private Right of Action Under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972,
73 Nw. U.L. Exv. 772 (1978). The inadequate enforcement of title IX by HEW's
Office for Civil Rights has also been the focus of much debate. See, e.g., Note,
The Enforcement Provisions for Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972
Can be Strengthened to Make Title IX Regulations More Effective, 49 TEMP. L.Q.
207 (1975); Note, Implied Rights of Action to Enforce Civil Rights: The Case
for a Sympathetic View, 87 YA= LJ. 1378, 1404-06 (1978).
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under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance." 23
ED has consistently argued that the statutory term "no person"
includes employees at the affected educational institution.24  Most
courts, however, applying the doctrine of ejusdem generis, 25 have
rejected ED's interpretation. 26 Noting that the benefited class may
not, "on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be
denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under" any
federally financed education program,27 these courts have concluded
that students alone satisfy these criteria 28 and that section 1681 is
"indirect, if not obscure," 29 in its reference to teachers, faculty or
other employees of educational institutions.
2320 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1976).
The starting point in any case requiring statutory construction is, of course,
the language of the statute itself. Southeastern Community College v. Davis,
442 U.S. 397, 405 (1979). See generally Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the
Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REv. 527, 535 (1947) ("Though we may not
end with the words in construing a disputed statute, one certainly begins there.").
24 See, e.g., 1975 Hearings, supra note 9, at 477-78 (testimony of HEW
Secretary Weinberger); Brief for Federal Appellants at 13-14, North Haven Bd.
of Educ. v. Hufstedler, 629 F.2d 773 (2d Cir. 1980).
This expansive interpretation reflects the general principle that civil rights
statutes should be read broadly; exceptions to such statutes should be narrowly con-
strued. See 3 J. SuTLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 72.05
(4th ed. C. Sands 1973). Compare Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298, 307-08 (1969)
and Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 437 (1968) with A.H. Phillips,
Inc. v. Walling, 324 U.S. 490, 493 (1945).
25 When specific words follow general words, "the general words are con-
strued to embrace only objects similar in nature to those objects enumerated by the
. . . specific words." 2A J. SuTrraiLAND, supra note 24, at § 47.17 (footnote
omitted). Cf. R. DIcKE sON, Tim INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STAT-
uTEs 249 (1975) (ejusdem generis not actually a rule of construction, but a tool
for judicial law-making).
26 See, e.g., Brunswick School Bd. v. Califano, 449 F. Supp. 866, 870 (D. Me.
1978), aff'd, Islesboro School Comm. v. Califano, 593 F.2d 424 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979).
The Supreme Court, for its part, has until now avoided defining the term
"person." At most, the Court has recognized that students fall within the benefited
class. See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 693-94 (1979).
2720 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1976).
28 See, e.g., Islesboro School Comm. v. Califano, 593 F.2d 424, 426 (1st Cir.),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979); Seattle Univ. v. HEW, 16 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. 719, 720 (W.D. Wash. 1978), aff'd per curiam, 621 F.2d 992 (9th Cir.
1980), cert. granted sub nom. United States Dep't of Educ. v. Seattle Univ., 49
U.S.L.W. 3409 (U.S. Dec. 1, 1980) (No. 80-493); Romeo Community Schools v.
HEW, 438 F. Supp. 1021, 1031 (E.D. Mich. 1977), aff'd, 600 F.2d 581 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979). At least one exception to this holding has been
admitted by these courts. Under their interpretation, the statute would protect a
faculty member who has a government research grant, but only in his or her ca-
pacity as a direct beneficiary of the program. See, e.g., Islesboro School Comm.,
593 F.2d at 426; Seattle Univ., 16 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 720.
29 Romeo Community Schools v. HEW, 438 F. Supp. 1021, 1031 (E.D. Mich.
1977), aft'd, 600 F.2d 581 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979).
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This reading is unnecessarily restrictive. Of the three cate-
gories of persons protected under section 1681(a)-participants, bene-
ficiaries, and those "subjected to discrimination under" federally
financed education programs-only the beneficiary class appears, on
its face, to exclude employees. For while it is reasonable to argue
that students are the only intended beneficiaries of federal education
programs, it is equally reasonable to assume that teachers, as well as
students, are participants in these programs. And at the very least,
if men and women employed in a federally assisted educational pro-
gram are paid unequal salaries or are considered differently for
promotions based on their sex, such employees are arguably "sub-
jected to discrimination under" the program.30 Indeed, at least
one commentator has argued that this last category of protected
persons-those "subjected to discrimination"-was designed to be a
blanket provision prohibiting all forms of sex discrimination not
covered by either of the first two categories.31 Thus, though an
examination of the language employed in section 1681(a) is not
conclusive, it does suggest that employees are included within the
class of persons protected under the statute.
B. The Exemptions in Section 1681
ED also argues that Congress must have intended to cover
employees because the list of exemptions provided in section 1681 32
does not exclude employment from title IX's reach.33 Educational
institutions challenging ED's regulations, on the other hand, argue
3 0 See Dougherty County School Sys. v. Harris, 622 F.2d 735, 738 (5th Cir.
1980); Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit, at 12-13, Seattle Univ. v. HEW, 621 F.2d 992 (9th Cir.)
(per curiam), cert. granted sub nora. United States Dep't of Educ. v. Seattle
Univ., 49 U.S.L.W. 3409 (U.S. Dec. 1, 1980) (No. 80-493).
31 Note, Sex Discrimination and Intercollegiate Athletics, 61 IowA L. REV.
420, 462 (1975).
3220 U.S.C. §1681(a)(1)-(9) (1976). Subsection (a)(1) provides that
only admissions to institutions of vocational education, professional education, gradu-
ate higher education and public undergraduate higher education will be affected;
subsection (a)(2) delays application of title IX to institutions modifying their
single-sex status; subsection (a) (3) exempts religions institutions if title IX is
contrary to the tenets of the religion; subsection (a) (4) exempts all military or
merchant marine training institutions; subsection (a)(5) exempts traditionally
single-sex institutions; subsection (a) (6) exempts membership practices of
certain social fraternities and sororities and voluntary youth service organizations;
subsections (a)(7)-(9) exempt activities related to Boys/Girls State/Nation con-
ferences, father-son or mother-daughter activities (if reasonable opportunities ex-
ist for the opposite sex), and scholarships awarded to "beauty" pageant winners,
respectively.
33 Brief for Federal Appellants at 14-15, North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Huf-
stedler, 629 F.2d 773 (2d Cir. 1980).
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that because the statutory exemptions relate only to student activities
or enrollment, only students are covered by the statute.3 4 It is not
necessary to decide whether this conclusion is appropriate, however,
because its premise-that all the exemptions are student-related-is
flawed. The exemptions for religious and military institutions are
blanket exclusions from the statute and do not specify student-
related activities at such schools.&3 5 In fact, portions of the congres-
sional debate indicate that the religious and military school exemp-
tions actually remove teachers at these institutions from coverage,
thereby implying that teachers at other institutions are covered.36
Again, though the statutory language is not explicit, it does suggest
that ED's employment regulations were at least implicitly authorized
by Congress.
C. The Fund Termination Provision
Some opponents of the employment regulations argue that the
plain language of section 1682, title IX's fund termination pro-
vision, precludes the possibility of implicit congressional authoriza-
tion. Section 1682 provides that a cutoff of funds "shall be limited
in its effect to the particular program, or part thereof, in which
. noncompliance has been . . . found." 37 Although tradi-
tionally called a "pinpoint provision" for the termination of funds,
34 Several courts holding ED's regulations invalid have relied upon this
argument. See, e.g., Islesboro School Comm. v. Califano, 593 F.2d 424, 426
(1st Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979); Seattle Univ. v. HEW, 16 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. 719, 720 (W.D. Wash. 1978), aff'd per curiam, 621 F.2d 992
(9th Cir.), cert. granted sub nom. United States Dep't of Educ. v. Seattle Univ.,
49 U.S.L.W. 3409 (U.S. Dec. 1, 1980) (No. 80-493); Romeo Community Schools
v. HEW, 438 F. Supp. 1021, 1032 (E.D. Mich. 1977), aff'd, 600 F.2d 581 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979).
35 North Haven Bd. of Educ., 629 F.2d at 778.
36 In a dialogue clearly referring to the title IX prohibition and its exemptions,
Senators Fell and Bayh had the following conversation:
MR. P r.. Would this apply to a parochial school where they have
nuns as teachers?
MR. BAYH. No. There is an explicit exception for educational insti-
tutions controlled by a religious organization.
MR. Prr. Mr. President, I refer to a preparatory school such as
Peekskill Military Institute which is at the high school level. Would that
school be expected to have women teachers?
MR. BAYH. All military schools are excluded.
118 CONG. REc. 5813 (1972).
37 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1976). See note 5 supra.
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many courts have labeled this a "program specific" sanction.38  Re-
gardless of the label employed, educators and the majority of courts
argue that because title IX's sanction has been so circumscribed,
ED's regulatory authority under the statute must be equally limited.
Regulation of an institution's employment practices, an area that is
inherently nonprogram-specific, they argue, is therefore patently
overbroad.3 9
Judge Oakes, responding to this argument in North Haven
Board of Education v. Hufstedler, refused to read the pinpoint
provision into title IX's general prohibition.40 Instead, he found
that limiting an eventual cutoff of funds to programs in which
discriminatory practices are found need not also restrict ED's regu-
lations prohibiting sex discrimination. Sections 1681 and 1682 have
3sSee, e.g., Romeo Community Schools v. HEW, 438 F. Supp. 1021, 1033
(E.D. Mich. 1977), aff'd, 600 F.2d 581 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 972
(1979).
39Id. The district court in Seattle Univ. v. HEW also held that the scope
of § 1681 is "program specific" and therefore cannot be used to regulate employ-
ment Its conclusion, however, was based on a narrow reading of the words
"program or activity" in § 1681 itelf. 16 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 719, 720-21 (W.D.
Wash. 1978), aff'd per euriam, 621 F.2d 992 (9th Cir.), cert. granted sub nom.
United States Dep't of Educ. v. Seattle Univ., 49 U.S.L.W. 3409 (U.S. Dec. 1,
1980) (No. 80-493).
There is an ongoing debate concerning the scope of "program or activity" as
it appears in the prohibitory language of title IX. See text accompanying note 23
supra for the relevant text of § 1681. Most of this debate relies on similar lan-
guage appearing in title VL See note 44 infra for the relevant text of § 2000d
of title VI. One view asserts that the words "program or activity" authorize regu-
lations that are institutional in scope; for example, regulations covering an entire
school district or institution of higher education would be acceptable. See, e.g.,
1975 Hearings, supra note 9, at 182-83 (colloquy between Representative Chisholm
and Senator Bayh); cf. Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 568 (1974) (under title
VI, entire school system referred to as "educational program"); Bossier Parish
School Bd. v. Lemon, 370 F.2d 847, 852 (5th Cir. 1967) (under title VI, board
"accepted federal financial assistance . . . and thereby brought its school system
within the class of programs subject to the section [2000d] prohibition against dis-
crimination"). The opposing view, relying on Board of Pub. Instruction v. Finch,
414 F.2d 1068 (5th Cir. 1969), contends that "program" refers to individual
grant-in-aid statutes. See id. 1077-78. Finch may be distinguishable, however,
because the court was addressing only the title VI pinpoint provision limiting the
statutory sanction and was not concerned with the prohibitory language of title
VI. Alternatively, the Finch approach may be too strict because it forces the agency
"to follow every federal dollar and determine whether it serves a discriminatory
end." Note, Administrative Cutoff of Federal Funding Under Title VI: A Pro-
posed Interpretation of "Program," 52 IN. LJ. 651, 667 (1977). See generally
Comment, Board of Public Instruction v. Finch: Unwarranted Compromise of Title
VI's Termination Sanction, 118 U. PA. L. REv. 1113 (1970). In any case, the
Seattle University court's reliance on § 1681 language is not as convincing as may
first appear. But ef. Comment, HEW's Regulation Under Title IX of the Educa-
tion Amendments of 1972: Ultra Vires Challenges, 1976 B.Y.U. L. REv. 133,
169-84 (Congress intended programmatic application of title IX); Note, Title IX
Sex Discrimination Regulations: Impact on Private Education, 65 Ky. LJ. 656,
689-94 (1977) (title IX applies to programs, not institutions).
40 629 F.2d at 785-86.
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different scopes-the former section is a broad prohibition of sex
discrimination; the latter section contains a narrow fund termina-
tion provision.41 Reading these sections coterminously ignores the
plain language of the statute. Moreover, employment practices are
not the only nonprogram-specific activities that ED has attempted
to regulate. Admissions to public undergraduate colleges, for ex-
ample, may be discriminatory on an institution-wide basis, yet ED
clearly has the statutory authority to ensure compliance in that
area.42 If employees are covered by title IX, the scope of employ-
ment discrimination does not differ from undergraduate admissions
in any relevant sense. Once again, therefore, the plain language of
title IX cannot be said to conclusively determine whether or not
employment discrimination is covered by the statute.
II. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TITLE IX
Because the plain language of title IX is inconclusive, the
events and words surrounding the statute's enactment must be
considered.43 In this part of the Comment, therefore, the legislative
history is examined to determine whether Congress intended to
place employment discrimination within the reach of title IX.
A. Pre-Enactment
1. The Link with Title VI
There is no doubt that "[t]itle IX was patterned after Title VI
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964." 44 In fact, title IX was originally
41 Center for National Policy Review, Memorandum to Project on Equal Pro-
tection Rights (April 7, 1975), reprinted in 1975 Hearings, supra note 9, at 191-96;
accord, North Haven Bd. of Educ., 629 F.2d at 785-86.
42 Such admissions policies are explicitly covered by 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1)
(1976). The Second Circuit used graduate admissions to illustrate this point,
North Haven Bd. of Educ., 629 F.2d at 785, but such policies are more likely to
be accomplished on a "program specific" basis than are undergraduate admissions.
43 Compare North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Hufstedler, 629 F.2d 773, 778 (2d
Cir. 1980) ("We hence must look beyond the language of the statute itself to
determine its meaning.") with Islesboro School Comm. v. Califano, 593 F.2d 424,
426-27 (1st Cir.) ("Since, however, employees are not expressly eliminated from
the statutes coverage, and in light of HEW's strong urging that employees should
be construed as coming within the coverage of the statute, we examine the legis-
lative history for any illumination it can shed.") (emphasis in original), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 972 (1979). For an analysis of the "plain meaning rule," accompanied
by the view that the context of the words must be considered, see R. DIcx=soN,
supra note 25, at 229-33. But see Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153,
184 n.29 (1978) ("When confronted with a statute which is plain and unam-
biguous on its face, we ordinarily do not look to legislative history as a guide to
its meaning.").
44 Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 694 (1979) (footnote
omitted). Title VI can be found in the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d
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contemplated as a simple amendment adding the word "sex" to the
words "race, color, or national origin" in title VI. 4 5 Had that
actually occurred, employment practices would be exempt from sex
discrimination regulations because section 2000d-3 of title VI ex-
plicitly excludes employment from that title's scope. 46 Apparently
to avoid any "gutting" of title VI that might occur if it were opened
to floor amendments, 47 title IX's sponsors decided to propose sepa-
rate educational amendments. Because changes were made in these
amendments as they proceeded through the House and Senate, the
version of title IX that was eventually enacted is similar, but not
identical, to title VI. Those differences that do exist have become
important because, "in the absence of specific Congressional indica-
tions to the contrary, [ED] has basically interpreted title IX con-
sistently with interpretations of title VI in similar areas." -1
For the purpose of determining whether title IX covers em-
ployment discrimination, the most significant difference between
titles IX and VI is that title IX contains no parallel provision
exempting employment from its reach.49  Such a provision did ap-
to 2000d-6 (1976). Section 2000d of that title provides that "[n]o person in the
United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded
from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination
under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000d (1976). The language differs from that eventually enacted as title IX in two
respects. First, title VI prohibits "race, color, or national origin" discrimination
rather than sex discrimination; second, it applies to "any program or activity" re-
ceiving federal funds rather than only educational programs or activities. See
text accompanying note 23 supra.
45 See H.R. 16098, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. § 805(a), reprinted in Discrimination
Against Women: Hearings on Section 805 of H.R. 16098 Before the Special Sub-
comm. on Education of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 91st Cong.,
2d Sess. 1 (1970) [hereinafter cited as 1970 Hearings].
4642 U.S.C. § 2000d-3 (1976) provides: "Nothing contained in this subchap-
ter shall be construed to authorize action under this subchapter by any de-
partment or agency with respect to any employment practice of any employer,
employment agency, or labor organization except where a primary objective of the
Federal financial assistance is to provide employment."
47See 1975 Hearings, supra note 9, at 409 (statement of Congressman
O'Hara). Simply adding the word "sex" to title VI would have prohibited gender-
based discrimination in any program receiving federal monies; title IX, in contrast,
is limited to educational programs. The rationale for this modification was ex-
plained by the Supreme Court in Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677,
694-95 nn.16 & 17 (1979).
During hearings before the House Special Subcommittee on Education, it
became clear that sex discrimination complaints involved primarily educational
institutions. 1970 Hearings, supra note 45. The narrower amendment that eventu-
ally became title IX was designed to address such complaints, Cannon, 441 U.S.
at 694-95 n.16, and to recognize the impact that schools and colleges have on the
development of individuals in our society. See notes 108-10 infra & accompanying
text.
4840 Fed. Reg. 24,134 (1975) (emphasis added).
49 See note 46 supra & accompanying text.
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pear in the original House-passed version,50 but it was removed by
the conference committee that had to reconcile the House and
Senate bills. The only record of this deletion appears in the con-
ference reports:
In addition, the House amendment, but not the Senate
amendment, provided that nothing in the title authorizes
action by any department or agency with respect to any
employment practice of any employer, employment agency,
or labor organization except where a primary objective of
the Federal financial assistance is to provide employment.
The House recedes.5 1
ED points to this recision as direct authority for its employment
regulations.52 Most courts, however, have concluded that the em-
60 H.R. 7248, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 904, 117 CoNG. REc. 39354, 39365
(1971).
51 S. REP. No. 798, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 221, reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 2608, 2671-72. The same description appears in the House
Conference Report. H.R. REP. No. 1085, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 221 (1972).
52 Brief for Federal Appellants at 30-31, North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Huf-
stedler, 629 F.2d 773 (2d Cir. 1980); accord, 1975 Hearings, supra note 9, at 329
(statement of Dr. Bernice Sandier).
ED claims further support for its position by analogizing the title IX employ-
ment coverage issue to that considered in United States v. City of Chicago, 395
F. Supp. 329 (N.D. Ill.), aff'd mem., 525 F.2d 695 (7th Cir. 1975). That case
involved a termination of revenue sharing funds under § 122(a) of the State and
Local Assistance Act of 1972, another statute patterned after title VI but exclud-
ing title VI's employment exemption. Section 122(a) provided that "[n]o person
in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, national origin, or sex,
be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under any program or activity funded in whole or in part with funds
made available under [the Act]." Pub. L. No. 92-512, § 122(a), 86 Stat. 932
(current version at 31 U.S.C. § 1242(a) (1) (1976)). A preliminary injunction
was issued against Treasury Department officials, prohibiting them from making
additional revenue sharing payments to the City of Chicago after prima facie
evidence was found that "the City's police department had engaged in sexually
and racially discriminatory policies and practices in respect to the employment and
promotion of police officers." 395 F. Supp. at 342. The City argued that, because
§ 122(b), Pub. L. No. 92-512, § 122(b), 86 Stat. 932 (current version at 31 U.S.C.
§ 1242(b) (2) (1976) (deleting provision relevant here)), permitted the Treasury
Secretary to exercise the powers provided in title VI, and title VI clearly excludes
employment, federal funds could not be terminated on the grounds of employment
discrimination. The court rejected this argument, stating "[tihat [the] restriction in
the Act of 1964 [the title VI employment exemption] cannot be regarded as limiting
the explicit language of Section 122(a) of the 1972 Revenue Sharing Act." 395
F. Supp. at 344. Similarly explicit language appears in title IX, enacted just four
months before the revenue sharing statute.
The First Circuit, however, rejected ED's reliance on City of Chicago, in
Islesboro School Comm. v. Califano, 593 F.2d 424, 429-30 (1st Cir.), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 972 (1979). The court described the revenue sharing act as embodying
"an entirely different legislative scheme" in which the participants and beneficiaries
of the program are the employees of the direct beneficiaries of the program-the
city's police, fire or other departments. In contrast, the court found, funds ex-
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ployment exemption was eliminated to correct a simple drafting
error. 3 As part of a larger legislative package when introduced,
title IX included amendments to title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 and to the Equal Pay Act." Each of these laws affects em-
ployment practices, and the package therefore would have been
internally inconsistent had a broadly worded employment exemp-
tion-applicable, ostensibly, to the entire package-been included in
one section.55
There is no simple resolution to this debate; both sides have
presented plausible reasons for the deletion of the employment
exemption. The opposing views, however, need not rest upon this
preliminary stalemate. Proponents of title IX's employment cover-
age ask why a more limited exemption, applicable only to those
sections currently referred to as title IX, was not substituted for
the deleted section. Such a provision could have excluded employ-
ment coverage while eliminating any drafting mistake.56 Moreover,
no drafting error was noted in the conference report. In response,
opponents of ED's employment regulations argue that merely re-
moving the employment exemption does not imply employment
coverage; explicit coverage of employees is required.57 These addi-
pended for educational programs are intended to benefit students. Id. 430; of.
Brunswick School Bd. v. Califano, 449 F. Supp. 866, 874 (D. Me. 1978), aff'd
sub nom. Islesboro School Comm. v. Califano, 593 F.2d 424 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979) (§ 122(a) of Revenue Sharing Act differs from title
IX because title IX has extensive list of coverage exclusions and was part of legis-
lative package that included provisions covering employment discrimination).
This distinction is not persuasive. Teachers may participate in and benefit from
educational programs to the same extent that police officers participate in and
benefit from city police departments. The ultimate beneficiaries of education are
the students, but the ultimate beneficiary of police protection is the public.
53 See, e.g., Romeo Community Schools v. HEW, 600 F.2d 581, 584 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979); Islesboro School Comm. v. Califano,
593 F.2d 424, 428 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979). See also Kuhn,
supra note 10, at 57.
54 See notes 114-15 infra & accompanying text.
55Romeo Community Schools v. HEW, 600 F.2d 581, 584 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979); Islesboro School Comm. v. Caiffano, 593 F.2d 424,
428 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979).
56 North Haven Bd. of Educ., 629 F.2d at 783.
57To support this argument, opponents can cite the Justice Department's
1970 proposal for combating sex discrimination in educational institutions. That
draft bill not only excluded the employment exemption, but also added a new
subsection expressly prohibiting employment discrimination. See 1970 Hearings,
supra note 45, at 677-78, 690-91 (statement of Jerris Leonard). See also Brief
of Plaintiff-Appellees at 22-23, North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Hufstedler, 629
F.2d 773 (2d Cir. 1980). But see note 52 supra.
Opponents of employment coverage also argue that title VI, after which title
IX is patterned, see notes 44-48 supra & accompanying text, was not intended to
cover employment practices even without its employment exemption. They con-
tend that the employment exemption now found in § 2000d-3 of title VI was added
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tional arguments clarify the importance of the employment exemp-
tion, but they do not conclusively indicate Congress's intention
concerning the scope of title IX.
2. Congressional Debate
Statements made by members of Congress during the relevant
floor debates are another aid in the search for legislative intent.
Although it is dangerous to rely too heavily on casual statements
made during such debates," the views of the chief sponsors of any
legislation are entitled to some weight. 59 This is especially true
when, as here, the law eventually enacted was introduced as an
amendment on the Senate floor and no useful committee reports
are available 0 Statements made by Senator Bayh, the chief sponsor
of title IX, should be examined closely, therefore, in determining
whether Congress intended title IX to reach employment dis-
crimination.6
There is no doubt that Senator Bayh's remarks about title IX
frequently referred to employment discrimination.2 Those courts
finding little significance in these statements, however, conclude
that the Senator was always referring to the entire title IX legisla-
during the legislative debate for clarification purposes only. See 110 CONG. REC.
12720 (1964) (statement of Senator Humphrey) ("This provision . . . serves to
spell out more precisely the declared scope of the title."). But see notes 143-54
infra & accompanying text.
58 See Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 396 (1951)
(Jackson, J., concurring).
59 "It is the sponsors that we look to when the meaning of the statutory words
is in doubt." National Woodwork Mfrs. Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612, 640 (1967)
(quoting Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 394-95
(1951)); 2A J. SUrERAND, supra note 24, at §48.15. Each court considering
whether Congress intended title IX to cover employment discrimination has given
some weight to Senator Bayh's statements made during the floor debates. See
cases cited in notes 15, 18, & 19 supra.
60 House committee reports and floor debates are of little value because they
largely ignored the employment issue. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 554, 92d Cong.,
1st Sess. 51-52, 108-09, reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2462,
2511-12, 2566-67; 117 CONG. Ruc. 39248-63. The House version of title IX, in
fact, contained an employment exemption until it was removed by the conference
committee. See notes 49-51 supra & accompanying text.
61 One concern traditionally expressed about a sponsor's construction of an
amendment is that he or she has an incentive to make statements calculated to
improve chances of the bill's passage. 2A J. Sum r.AND, supra note 24, at
§ 48.15. In this case, if Senator Bayh had wanted to slant his statements to im-
prove title IX's chances of passing, he would have slanted them toward limited
coverage and against the inclusion of employment. Any evidence that Senator
Bayh intended his amendment to cover employment, therefore, is entitled to some
weight.
62 See, e.g., text accompanying notes 65, 67, & 74 infra.
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tive package, including the title VII and Equal Pay Act amend-
ments.63 Analyzing several of the disputed statements in chrono-
logical order illustrates the ambiguity troubling the courts.
Senator Bayh first introduced tide IX in 1971 as an amendment
to a higher education bill then being debated. At that time, no
changes to any employment-related statute were included in his
amendment.6 4  Nonetheless, his description of the amendment
prominently mentioned employment discrimination: "While over
50 percent of our population is female, there is no effective protec-
tion for them as they seek admission and employment in educa-
tional facilities .... Today, women seeking employment in higher
education face an array of obstacles almost as insuperable as those
which used to face blacks." 65
During the next session, Senator Bayh reintroduced his amend-
ment in a proposal that also extended coverage of title VII and
the Equal Pay Act to educational institutions.66 Upon the intro-
duction of his modified amendment, Senator Bayh made the fol-
lowing comments:
Amendment No. 874 is broad, but basically it closes
loopholes in existing legislation relating to general educa-
tion programs and employment resulting from those pro-
grams.... More specifically, the heart of this amendment
is a provision banning sex discrimination in educational
programs receiving Federal funds. The amendment would
cover such crucial aspects as admissions procedures, scholar-
63See, e.g., Romeo Community Schools v. HEW, 600 F.2d 581, 585 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979); Islesboro School Comm. v. Califano,
593 F.2d 424, 427-28 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979). See notes
54-55 supra & accompanying text.
64Amend. No. 398 to S. 659, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 117 CoNG. Pxc. 30155-57
(1971).
65117 CoNG. REc. 30155-56 (1971) (emphasis added). See Senator Mc-
Govern's supporting statements citing employment statistics in educational institutions.
Id. 30158. Senator McGovern had his own sex discrimination amendent to offer,
which expressly covered employment, but he threw his support behind the Bayh
amendment. See id. 30411. No vote was taken on Senator Bayhas amendment
because it was ruled nongermane. Id. 30413-15.
Given that title IX was not part of a legislative package at the time of Sen-
ator Bayh's 1971 statements, see notes 64-65 supra & accompanying text, the courts
denying employment coverage have not provided an adequate explanation for these
earlier employment references. Indeed, no court other than the Second Circuit
has directly addressed these 1971 statements. See North Haven Bd. of Educ., 629
F.2d at 779. It is conceivable, however, that between congressional sessions,
Senator Bayh and his cosponsors decided that employment discrimination in educa-
tional institutions could be handled more effectively through other means-that
is, by amending title VII and the Equal Pay Act. See text accompanying note 73
supra.
66 118 CoNG. Ruc. 5802 (1972).
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ships, and faculty employment, with limited exceptions.
Enforcement powers include fund termination provisions-
and appropriate safeguards-parallel to those found in
title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Other important
provisions in the amendment would extend the equal em-
ployment opportunities provisions of title VII of the 1964
Civil Rights Act to educational institutions, and extend
the Equal Pay for Equal Work Act to include executive,
administrative and professional women. 67
Most courts have interpreted the above references to employ-
ment discrimination, as well as other employment-related state-
ments made after Senator Bayh introduced his modified amend-
ment, as applying to the entire legislative package. s The Second
Circuit, however, disputed this reading. As Judge Oakes noted,
"Senator Bayh in his quoted remarks quite clearly referred to 'fac-
ulty employment' in conjunction with the basic prohibition of his
amendment and then referred to the '[o]ther important provisions'
dealing with Title VII and the Equal Pay Act." 69
Similar distinctions have been made in judicial interpretations
of the summary of title IX 70 inserted into the record by Senator
Bayh prior to the statute's enactment.71 The headings provided
in the summary-"A. Prohibition of Sex Discrimination in Fed-
erally Funded Education Programs" and "B. Prohibition of Edu-
cation-Related Employment Discrimination"-seem to reflect the
dichotomy between title IX and the remainder of the legislative
package that has been noted by the majority of courts.7 2  Under
the first heading, however, Senator Bayh specifically noted that
"[t]his portion of the amendment covers discrimination in all areas
where abuse has been mentioned-employment practices for faculty
and administrators, scholarship aid, admissions, access to programs
within the institution such as vocational education classes, and so
forth." 73
The last passage of the debate to which ED points for support
of its employment regulations is a colloquy between Senators Bayh
67Id. 5803 (emphasis added).
68 See, e.g., cases cited in note 63 supra.
69 North Haven Bd. of Educ., 629 F.2d at 780 (emphasis in original).
70118 CONG. REc. 5806-08 (1972).
71 Compare North Haven Bd. of Educ., 629 F.2d at 780-81 with Islesboro
School Comm. v. Califano, 593 F.2d 424, 428 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
972 (1979) and Romeo Community Schools v. HEW, 600 F.2d 581, 585 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979).
72 See note 63 supra & accompanying text.
73 118 CONG. Ec. 5807 (1972) (emphasis added).
[Vol. 129:417
DOES TITLE IX REACH EMPLOYMENT?
and Pell, chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Education and
floor manager of the entire education bill:
MR. PELL .... [Section 1681 of title IX] include[s] all
educational institutions which receive Federal assistance.
This includes elementary and secondary schools as well.
With regard to private undergraduate colleges, the Senator
has excluded from coverage their admissions practices.
Does the same exclusion apply to nonpublic institutions
at the elementary and secondary level?
MR. BAYH. At the elementary and secondary levels,
admissions policies are not covered. As the Senator knows,
we are dealing with three basically different types of dis-
crimination here. We are dealing with discrimination in
admission to an institution, discrimination of available
services or studies within an institution once students are
admitted, and discrimination in employment within an
institution, as a member of a faculty or whatever.
In the area of employment, we permit no exceptions.
In the area of services, once a student is accepted within an
institution, we permit no exceptions. The Senator from
Rhode Island asked about admissions policies of private
secondary and primary schools. They would be excepted.
MR. PELL.... [D]o I understand the Senator to say
that the faculty of private schools would have to reflect a
sexual balance?
MR. BAYH. This amendment sets no quotas. It only
guarantees equality of opportunity. The Senator from
Indiana cannot be sure about the sexual balance in any
faculty, but as far as employment opportunities are con-
cerned, the answer would be "Yes." 74
Senator Pell's questions clearly seem related to those sections of
the bill that are now within title IX. The above colloquy suggests,
therefore, that Senator Bayh understood the prohibitory sections of
his amendment to cover employment practices. Most courts, how-
ever, consider this to be a strained interpretation.75 They concede
that Senator Bayh's responses may have been more expansive than
necessary, but this is explained by the inherent imprecisions in oral
74 Id. 5812-13.
75 See, e.g., Islesboro School Comm. v. Califano, 593 F.2d 424, 427 (Ist Cir.),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979).
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debate.76 Moreover, it is inaccurate, if not unfair, to remove state-
ments from their general context. The totality of Senator Bayh's
remarks, they conclude, show that only the modifications to title VII
and the Equal Pay Act were intended to affect employment.
77
Ultimately, examining isolated statements from congressional
debate, even statements attributed to the chief sponsor of the bill,
is an unsatisfying if not deceptive way to determine legislative in-
tent. There is no certain way to determine if Senator Bayh and
the majority of Congress intended title IX to reach employment-
for each remark that implies employment coverage, others exist that
suggest the opposite result.7 - Pre-enactment legislative history thus
is not determinative of congressional intent concerning the scope
of title IX.
B. Post-Enactment
That Congress continued to concern itself with the scope of
title IX even after its enactment is not unusual; the legislature is
expected to follow and react to the consequences of its previous
actions.79 Post-enactment statements or actions by Congress or its
members should be surveyed, therefore, to determine whether refer-
ences have been made to employment coverage under title IX, and
if so, to determine the weight properly accorded to such references.
Three separate areas of congressional action will be considered
briefly: first, an analysis of title IX inserted into the record by
Senator Bayh; second, Congress's failure to disapprove the employ-
ment regulations issued by ED; and third, various attempts by
individual members of Congress to limit title IX's employment
coverage.
One month after title IX was passed, Senator Bayh submitted
an analysis of the statute into the record.80 This analysis, prepared
by the Association of American Colleges, summarized the legal re-
quirements imposed by title IX. Although post-enactment expla-
76 See, e.g., id.
77 See, e.g., id.
78As Chief Justice Marshall so aptly explained in another context, "where
the mind labours to discover the design of the legislature, it seizes every thing from
which aid can be derived." United States v. Fisher, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 358,
386 (1805).
79 "Legislative oversight of administration is a familiar and well-grounded as-
sumption of responsible government. Accepted, too, is the corollary that the need
for such oversight increases with executive initiative in policy and the delegation
of discretion under the broad terms of statutes ...... Macmahon, Congressional
Oversight of Administration: The Power of the Purse, in LEGISLATVE PoLrrcs
U.S.A. 185 (2d ed. T. Lowi 1965).
80 118 CoNc. REc. 24683-85 (1972).
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nations by individual members of Congress are entitled to "little or
no weight" when interpreting statutes,"' it is interesting to note
that this analysis clearly included employment within the scope of
the title.,2
A more significant part of the "subsequent legislative history"
followed ED's promulgation of the title IX regulations in June
1975. 13 Under the General Education Provisions Act (GEPA),8s
ED was required to submit its final title IX regulations to both
houses of Congress at the same time it published them in the
Federal Register. Congress then had forty-five days to pass a con-
current resolution to keep the regulations from taking effect.8 5 The
applicable standard was whether "the final regulation is inconsistent
with the Act from which it derives its authority." s1
ED followed this procedure, noting, however, that the executive
branch had grave reservations about the practicality and the consti-
tutionality of the legislative veto procedure.8 7 In the Senate, no
action beyond the introduction of several disapproval resolutions
was taken.88 In the House, the Subcommittee on Postsecondary
81 Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 209 (1978); accord, South-
eastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 411 n.11 (1979); Regional
Rail Reorganization Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 132 (1974). But see North Haven Bd.
of Educ., 629 F.2d at 782.
82 "Title VI also specifically excludes employment from coverage (except where
the primary objective of the federal aid is to provide employment). There is no
similar exemption for employment in the sex discrimination provisions relating to
federally assisted education programs." 118 CONG. REC. 24684 n.1 (1972) (empha-
sis in original).
83 See note 9 supra.
84 20 U.S.C. §§ 1221-1233h (1976).
85 20 U.S.C. § 1232(d)(1) (1976). The forty-five day period is adjusted for
periods of adjournment. Id. § 1232(d) (2). The agency may modify a regula-
tion if a concurrent resolution of disapproval is passed; in propounding a modified
regulation, the agency must "indicate how the modification differs from the pro-
posed regulation ...earlier disapproved, and how the agency believes the modi-
fication disposes of the findings by Congress in the concurrent resolution of
disapproval." Id. § 1232(e). These provisions are explicitly applicable to ttle
IX and its regulations. Id. § 1232(f).
861d. § 1232(d)(1).
871975 Hearings, supra note 9, at 6-7, 441, 460-62 (letter and testimony of
HEW Secretary Weinberger); accord, Statement on the Education Amendments of
1974, in 1974 Put. P.ras 35, 37. The controversy surrounding the legislative
veto is beyond the scope of this Comment, but many articles have discussed the
issues. See, e.g., Bruff & Gellhorn, Congressional Control of Administrative Regu-
lation: A Study of Legislative Vetoes, 90 K-Lnv. L. REv. 1369 (1977); Schwartz,
The Legislative Veto and the Constitution-A Reexamination, 46 GEo. WASH. L.
REv. 351 (1978); Watson, Congress Steps Out: A Look at Congressional Control of
the Executive, 63 CALwm. L. REv. 983 (1975).
88 Only one of those resolutions was relevant to employment coverage under
title IX, and that was a blanket disapproval submitted by Senator Helms. The
North Carolina Senator did specifically mention the alleged invalidity of the em-
ployment regulations when introducing his resolution. S. Con. Res. 46, 94th Cong.,
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Education held six days of hearings to consider ED's regulations.8 9
By far, the most controversial subject during the hearings was the
application of the regulations to intercollegiate athletics.8 0 A few
statements disagreeing with the employment regulations were
made,91 but most witnesses addressing the issue supported that por-
tion of the regulations addressing employment practices. 92  A reso-
lution of disapproval was reported out to the full committee, but
it objected to only three provisions-the self-evaluation procedures
imposed on institutions, the grievance procedures imposed on insti-
tutions, and the provision requiring religious institutions to apply
for exemption. 93  The full Committee on Education and Labor
returned the resolution to its Subcommittee on Equal Opportunities
where its demise was certain.9 4 That subcommittee held a one-day
hearing and recommended rejection of the resolution.9 5
Courts considering the validity of ED's title IX employment
regulations have disagreed on the significance of this congressional
inaction. Several possible interpretations can be suggested. First,
the legislative failure to disapprove the regulations can be taken as
1st Sess., 121 CoNG. REc. 17301 (1975) (statement of Senator Helms) ("While
it was the obvious intent of the statute that it apply to those seeking an educa-
tional opportunity, the regulations cover the employees of educational institutions,
whether they be maintenance personnel, administrative staff or teachers. Again,
the regulations are inconsistent with the congressional enactment.").
89 See 1975 Hearings, supra note 9.
90 See id. passim.
91 See id. 401-15 (statement and testimony of Janet L. Kuhn). Congressmen
O'Hara and Bell expressed agreement with Ms. Kuhn's analysis. Id. 408-09. See
also note 10 supra.
92 See, e.g., 1975 Hearings, supra note 9, at 140 (testimony of Jean Simmons,
Federation of Organizations for Professional Women), 154-55 (statement of Rep-
resentative Carr), 164 (testimony of Representative Mink), 173 (testimony of
Senator Bayh), 329 (statement of Dr. Bernice Sandier, Association of American
Colleges), 466 (testimony of HEW Secretary Weinberger).
93H.R. Con. Res. 330, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975), reprinted in Hearing on
House Concurrent Resolution 330 (Title IX Regulation) Before the Subcomm. on
Equal Opportunities of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 94th Cong.,
1st Sess. 2 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Concurrent Resolution Hearings].
94 Even if the subcommittee had made its recommendations to the full com-
mittee on the same day that the resolution of disapproval was returned to it, the
resolution would have had to be approved by the full committee, the Rules Com-
mittee, the full House, and the Senate within a week. It was unlikely that Congress
would meet this timetable, and in fact, it did not. See 31 CoNG. Q. ALMANAc 664
(1975).
95 See Concurrent Resolution Hearings, supra note 93. Representative Martin
also introduced a broad disapproval resolution to void the employment regulations.
See H.R. Con. Res. 310, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 121 CONG. REC. 19209 (1975).
For a more exacting description of the House committee proceedings, see Com-
ment, HEW's Regulation Under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972:
Ultra Vires Challenges, 1976 B.Y.U. L. REv. 133, 146-48 and 31 CoNG. Q. AL-
MANAc 662-65 (1975).
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congressional approval of the regulations. No authorities support
such an interpretation. Second, the congressional failure to dis-
approve can create a presumption of approval. Although a few
authorities may support such a reading, 6 Congress itself rejected
such an interpretation in an amendment to GEPA passed just four
months after the title IX regulations became effective.97 Third,
the failure to disapprove may lend some weight to the conclusion
that Congress intended to reach employment practices under title
IX. Accepting this interpretation, the Second Circuit concluded
that the congressional review of title IX regulations was "not with-
out significance." 98 Finally, the failure to disapprove may be con-
sidered irrelevant to a determination of title IX's reach. This is
essentially the position taken by the majority of courts deciding
the employment coverage issue.99
Regardless of the weight given to this legislative inaction, how-
ever, several points should be made. It is clear that Congress was
aware of the controversy surrounding the employment regulations;
yet it did not focus on the issue. It is also certain that Congress's
failure to disapprove the regulations does not support the notion
that Congress excluded employment from title IX's reach. Ulti-
mately, the failure to pass any disapproval resolutions must be
judged in the context of all congressional post-enactment reactions
to the statute. For example, several exemptions have been added
06 See, e.g., Costanzo v. Tillinghast, 287 U.S. 341, 345 (1932); Comment,
Half-Court Girls' Basketball Rules: An Application of the Equal Protection Clause
and Title IX, 65 IowA L. REv. 766, 787-88 (1980) [hereinafter cited as IowA
Comment].
o7 That amendment added the following language:
Failure of the Congress to adopt such a concurrent resolution with respect
to any such final standard, rule, regulation, or requirement prescribed under
any such Act, shall not represent, with respect to such final standard,
rule, regulation, or requirement, an approval or finding of consistency
with the Act from which it derives its authority for any purpose, nor
shall such failure to adopt a concurrent resolution be construed as evi-
dence of an approval or finding of consistency necessary to establish a
prima facie case, or an inference or presumption, in any judicial pro-
ceeding.
Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-142, § 7(b),
89 Stat 773, 796 (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1232(d) (1976) (with inaccuracies)).
See note 85 supra & accompanying text.
9S North Haven Bd. of Educ., 629 F.2d at 783. See also IowA Comment,
supra note 96, at 787 (congressional "approval" of title IX regulations "cannot be
considered unimportant or perfunctory"); YA I. Note, supra note 22, at 1262
(Congress's retention of a veto over regulations implies that ED should be al-
lowed to promulgate broad regulations).
99 The courts cite the 1975 amendment to GEPA, note 97 supra, to support
their conclusion. See, e.g., Islesboro School Comm. v. Califano, 593 F.2d 424,
428-29 n.3 (1st Cir.) ("Congressional inaction should not lightly be construed
as approvaL"), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979).
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to title IX since its original enactment.100 Congressional attempts
to limit the employment coverage of title IX, however, have never
advanced beyond their introduction by individual members.101
Considered together with Congress's failure to enact any of the dis-
approval resolutions during 1975, this inaction, although not con-
clusive, suggests that employment coverage was originally contem-
plated by Congress.10 2
While the legislative history does seem to support employment
coverage, such an important question concerning the scope of title
IX's remedy should not be decided on such ambiguous evidence.
Each extract from the legislative history that appears to prove that
Congress intended title IX to reach employment practices can also
be explained by other reasoning. The Education Amendments of
1972 were a massive congressional enactment, containing many
controversial provisions; the bulk of congressional debate did not
even consider the sex discrimination provisions. Moreover, the
current version of title IX was amended onto the statute during
floor debate and closed conference committee proceedings; 103 thus,
no useful committee reports explaining the provision exist. Such
a limited legislative history cannot be dispositive of the title IX
employment coverage issue.
III. FURTHERING THE PURPOSES BEHIND TITLE IX
Because the plain language and the legislative history of title
IX are inconclusive, it is necessary to ask whether employment
coverage under title IX is consistent with the broad remedial pur-
poses underlying the statute's enactment. 0 4 As Justice Frank-
furter commented:
10oSubsection 1681(a)(6) was added in 1974. Pub. L. No. 93-568, §3(a),
88 Stat. 1862 (1974) (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(6) (1976)). Subsections
1681(a)(7)-(9) were added in 1976. Pub. L. No. 94-482, title IV, §412(a),
90 Stat. 2234 (1976) (codified at 20 U.S.C. §§1681(a)(7)-(9) (1976)). See
note 32 supra.
101 See, e.g., S. 2146, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 121 CONG. IEc. 23845-47 (1975)
(introduced by Senator Helms); Unprinted Amend. No. 389, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.,
122 CONG. REC. 28136-48 (1976) (introduced by Senator McClure).
102 For the view that congressional reactions to regulations should carry more
weight if they are based on policy, rather than legal, grounds, see Bruff & Gell-
horn, supra note 87, at 1429-33.
103 See note 60 supra & accompanying text.
104 Distinguishing between "legislative intent" and 'legislative purpose" has
long been the subject of legal, as well as philosophical, discussion. See, e.g., R.
DicaisoN, supra note 25, at 87-88; Landis, A Note on "Statutory Interpretation,"
43 HARv. L. REv. 886, 888 (1930). Throughout this Comment, "intent" refers to
the particular application of a statute that Congress desired, as evidenced by the
legislative history. "Purpose," on the other hand, refers to the "general aim or
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[T]he purpose which a court must effectuate is not that
which Congress should have enacted, or would have. It
is that which it did enact, however inaptly, because it may
fairly be said to be imbedded in the statute, even if a spe-
cific manifestation was not thought of, as is often the very
reason for casting a statute in very general terms.
Often the purpose or policy that controls is not di-
rectly displayed in the particular enactment. Statutes
cannot be read intelligently if the eye is closed to con-
siderations evidenced in affiliated statutes, or in the known
temper of legislative opinion.
05
The social policy considerations motivating Congress when
title IX was enacted in 1972 are well-known.106 Sex discrimination
was a prime target of congressional action that year,107 and employ-
ment discrimination in educational institutions was of particular
concern to the legislators who enacted title IX. Congress realized
that deep-rooted changes in society are often first attempted in our
policy which pervades a statute." Cox, Judge Learned Hand and the Interpretation
of Statutes, 60 HAIv. L. REv. 370, 370 (1947). Professor Cox has provided a
useful example:
In enacting the Fair Labor Standards Act . . . it was the "purpose" of
Congress to raise the standard of living of workers engaged in interstate
commerce or in the production of goods for commerce. When it defined
production to include "any process or occupation necessary to the produc-
tion thereof," Congress "intended" . . . to make the act applicable to
maintenance workers in the executive offices of interstate producers.
Id. 371 (footnotes omitted). Such a distinction is especially appropriate when
discussing title IX because the Supreme Court has already used a similar analysis
in this area. In Cannon v. University of Chicago, the Court applied four factors
to determine if Congress intended to make the title IX remedy available to private
litigants. 441 U.S. 677, 688 & n.9 (1979) (citing Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78
(1975)). To examine the second factor-whether there is any indication of legis-
lative intent, explicit or implicit, to create or deny such a remedy-the Court looked
to the legislative history of title IX. Id. 694-703. When examining the third
factor-whether a private right of action is consistent with the underlying purposes
of the legislative scheme-the Court looked to the objectives of title IX. Id.
703-06. See notes 120-22 infra & accompanying text. Cf. United Steelworkers
v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 201 (1979) ("The prohibition against racial discrimina-
tion in . ..Title VII must therefore be read against the background of the legis-
lative history of Title VII and the historical context from which the Act arose.").
Courts addressing the title IX employment coverage issue generally have found
the language or legislative history of the statute to be determinative, and have
failed, therefore, to examine sufficiently the congressional purposes underlying title
IX. See, e.g., North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Hufstedler, 629 F.2d 773, 784-85
(2d Cir. 1980); Romeo Community Schools v. HEW, 438 F. Supp. 1021, 1032,
1034 (E.D. Mich. 1977), aff'd, 600 F.2d 581, 584-85 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 972 (1979).
105 Frankfurter, supra note 23, at 539.
10 6 See 1970 Hearings, supra note 45; YALE Note, supra note 22, at 1264
n.6 9 ("Certainly, the basic purpose and policy of Title IX was to eliminate sex
discrimination and sex stereotyping in education.").
107 See note 2 supra & accompanying text.
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educational institutions.'0 s  Teachers, administrators, indeed all
employees working in educational institutions have a tremendous
impact on the ultimate prejudices of their students. Our schools
"are the laboratories in which the prejudice of our children are
[sic] reinforced or dispelled, their stereotypes shaped or discarded,
their expectations instilled, and in which the aspirations of a new
generation are crushed or encouraged." 109 When students see
female teachers under the control of male administrators, impres-
sions are created that are difficult to combat. 10 The same sex
stereotyping occurs when only a few women are members of a uni-
versity's faculty, or when discrimination against school guidance
counselors results in gender-based career advice to students.
If eliminating discrimination is important anywhere, then, it
is in the realm of education because the effects of employment dis-
crimination are potentially more devastating in this context than in
any other."' The Ninety-second Congress recognized this fact, and
made the eradication of sex stereotyping in education a primary
108 The same idea was expressed by the Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of
Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
' 09 Runyan, Employment Decision-Making in Educational Institutions,-26
WA. L. REv. 955, 1018 (1980). See also Note, Teaching Woman Her Place:
The Role of Public Education in the Development of Sex Roles, 24 HASmNGs L.J.
1191, 1191 (1973) ("Through an intricate web of formal and informal educa-
tional processes, . . . schools impose upon girls a restricting set of sexual stereo-
types that discourage their aspirations and limit their sense of autonomy and
self-image.").
110 See, e.g., Commissioner's Task Force, Office of Education, A Look at
Women in Education, reprinted in The Women's Educational Equity Act: Hear-
ings on H.R. 208 Before the Subcomm. on Equal Opportunities of the House Comm.
on Education and Labor, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 57, 59 (1973) (footnote omitted)
("[W]hen children look at adult roles in their own schools, . . . they are likely to
see that women teach and men run things: and [sic] early and potentially damaging
lesson in 'career education.' For while 85 percent of all public school elementary
teachers are women, 79 percent of the elementary school principals are men.")
[hereinafter cited as 1973 Hearings].
"'l Throughout the litigation in this area, ED has argued that, even if title
IX does not authorize regulation of employment directly, the agency can prohibit
sex discrimination in employment to the extent that it constitutes discrimination
against students. See, e.g., Brief for Federal Appellants at 46-49, North Haven
Bd. of Educ. v. Hufstedler, 629 F.2d 773 (2d Cir. 1980). This so-called "infection
theory" is similar to, but more limited than, the argument made in this Comment
that Congress intended title IX to reach all employment practices because em-
ployees in educational institutions have a major impact on the ultimate prejudices of
students. See notes 108-10 supra & accompanying text.
The infection theory is supported by several cases recognizing its use in the
prohibition of racial discrimination under title VI. In United States v. Jefferson
County Bd. of Educ., for example, the Fifth Circuit recognized that, even
with an employment exemption, title VI authorizes some regulation of teachers
and faculty. The court explained that "[i]ntegration of faculty is indispensable to
the success of desegregation plan [sic]. Nor can we impute to Congress the inten-
tion to license, unconstitutionally, discrimination in the employment and assignment
of teachers, a conspicuous badge of de jure segregated schools." 372 F.2d 836,
885-86 (5th Cir. 1966), adopted en bana per curiam, 380 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.),
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goal." 2  The House hearings that initiated title IX included much
evidence on the detrimental effects that employment discrimina-
tion in schools could have both on the employees, and more im-
portantly, on the students." 3 To combat these adverse effects,
Congress amended both title VII 114 and the Equal Pay Act 15 to
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 840 (1967). Three years later, the Fifth Circuit further
articulated this basis for employment regulation under title VI:
Clearly the racial composition of a schoors . . . faculty may have an
effect upon the particular program in question. But this may not always
be the case. In deference to that possibility, the administrative agency
seeking to cut off federal funds must make findings of fact indicating
either that a particular program is itself administered in a discriminatory
manner, or is so affected by discriminatory practices elsewhere in the
school system that it thereby becomes discriminatory.
Board of Pub. Instruction v. Finch, 414 F.2d 1068, 1079 (5th Cir. 1969); accord,
Caulfield v. Board of Educ., 583 F.2d 605, 610-11 (2d Cir. 1978).
ED suggests that having a disproportionate number of males in administra-
tive positions, compensating females at a lower rate than their male counterparts,
or discriminating against female guidance counselors infects students when they
become aware of such practices or utilize such services. It argues that the infec-
tion theory, therefore, should be accepted under title IX. Brief for Federal Ap-
pellants at 47-49, North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Hufstedler, 629 F.2d 773 (2d
Cir. 1980). Most courts addressing the infection theory in the context of title IX
have not considered it necessary to discuss the merits of this contention, however,
because ED's regulations are general in nature and are not limited to discriminatory
employment practices affecting students. See, e.g., Islesboro School Comm. v.
Califano, 593 F.2d 424, 430 (1st Cir.) ("while the basic premise [of the infection
theory] might be correct, that does not adequately underpin a grant of authority
to [ED] to promulgate broad-ranging regulations canvassing employment-related
discrimination."), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979); Seattle Univ. v. HEW, 16
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 719, 722 (W.D. Wash. 1978), aff'd per curiam, 621 F.2d
992 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. granted sub nom. United States Dep't of Educ. v.
Seattle Univ., 49 U.S.L.W. 3409 (U.S. Dec. 1, 1980) (No. 80-493); Romeo Com-
munity Schools v. HEW, 438 F. Supp. 1021, 1034-35 (E.D. Mich. 1977), aff'd,
600 F.2d 581 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979). The Second Circuit
found the broad ED regulations valid and enforceable and thus also did not reach
the infection issue. North Haven Bd. of Educ., 629 F.2d at 777-86; cf. 34 C.F.R.
§ 100.3(c) (3) (1980) (title VI regulation allowing employment coverage if some
effect on beneficiaries can be demonstrated). But see Caulfield v. Board of Educ.,
486 F. Supp. 862, 885 (E.D.N.Y. 1979) (infection theory accepted under title IX),
aff'd, 24 Empl. Prac. Dec. f31,270 (2d Cir. 1980).
11
2 See YALE Note, supra note 22, at 1264-69. See also 118 CONG. Rzc. 5804
(1972) (statement of Senator Bayh); 1973 Hearings, supra note 110, at 180-93
(Final Report of Sex Roles Stereotypes Project).
113 See, e.g., 1970 Hearings, supra note 45, at 147 (resolutions passed by
National Organization for Women), 178-79 (platform on women's rights of New
Democratic Coalition), 214 (article by Dr. Ann Scott), 435-39 (statement of Daisy
Shaw, Director of Educational and Vocational Guidance of New York City), 586,
607 (statement by Women's Fights Committee of New York University Law
School), 1081 (paper on status of women at Comell University).
114 The amendment to title VII was originally included as § 1005 of Senator
Bayh's amendment. 118 CONG. BEC. 5803 (1972). That amendment was ulti-
mately deleted in favor of one passed as part of the Equal Employment Op-
portunity Act, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a)
(1970)).
15 Pub. L. No. 92-318, § 906(b), 86 Stat. 375 (amending 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)
(1970)).
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include educational employment practices. It also enacted title
IX-whose broad, sweeping provisions would be especially effective
in countering the severe, and perhaps irremediable, impact of
employment discrimination in the nation's educational institutions.
Opponents of title IX's employment coverage argue that-
given title VII,116 the Equal Pay Act,117 and Executive Order Num-
ber 11,246, as amended "8-- Congress did not intend to add
another sanction against employee-related sex discrimination in the
educational context.119 As this Comment will demonstrate, how-
ever, these alternative remedies lack the clout of title IX-and are
therefore inadequate in combatting sex discrimination in our
schools, the institutions in which the devastating effects of sex
stereotyping are most deeply felt.
A. The Necessity of the Title IX Sanction
The Supreme Court has already had one opportunity to con-
sider the sweeping coverage of title IX. In Cannon v. University
of Chicago,120 the Court noted that "[t]itle IX . . . sought to ac-
complish two related, but nevertheless somewhat different, objec-
tives. First, Congress wanted to avoid the use of federal resources
to support discriminatory practices; second, it wanted to provide
individual citizens effective protection against those practices." 121
The second purpose noted by the Supreme Court was effectu-
ated in Cannon when the Court implied a private right of action
under title IX.122 The first purpose-avoiding the discriminatory
11642 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976, Supp. I 1977 & Supp. II 1978).
.1729 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1976).
118Exec. Order No. 11,246, 3 C.F.R. 339 (1964-65 Compilation), as amended
by Exec. Order No. 11,375, 3 C.F.R. 684 (1966-70 Compilation) and Exec. Order
No. 11,478, 3 C.F.R. 803 (1966-70 Compilation), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e,
at 1232 (1976).
119 See, e.g., Romeo Community Schools v. HEW, 438 F. Supp. 1021, 1034,
aff'd, 600 F.2d 581 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979).
120 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
121 Id. 704. For portions of the congressional debate identifying these two
objectives see id. 704 n.36 (citing 117 CoNG. RFc. 39252 (1971) (statement of
Representative Mink) and 118 CoNG. REc. 5806-07 (1972) (statement of Senator
Bayh)). For a criticism of the Supreme Court's analysis of title IX's purposes,
see Comment, A Private Right of Action Under Title IX: Cannon v. University of
Chicago, 57 DE.v. L.J. 437, 449-51 (1980).
122 Cannon, 441 U.S. at 705-06.
The plaintiff in Cannon was a female applicant who was denied admission
to medical school. Id. 680. The Cannon opinion, therefore, was concerned with
alleged student-related discrimination, and did not address the potential employment
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use of federal monies-is "generally served by the statutory proce-
dure for the termination of federal financial support for institu-
tions engaged in discriminatory practices." 123 None of the other
statutes proscribing sex discrimination in employment provide such
a sweeping remedy.
Of course, title VII does prohibit certain employment practices
that discriminate on the basis of sex, 12 and the Equal Pay Act pro-
hibits gender-based wage discrimination. 25 Both laws are inter-
preted and enforced by the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC). 26 The EEOC is authorized to investigate
complaints, determine whether unlawful discrimination has oc-
curred, and if it has, negotiate a voluntary settlement or file suit
coverage of title IX. But of. Sobel v. Yeshiva Univ., 477 F. Supp. 1161, 1167-68
(S.D.N.Y. 1979) (employees not within the benefited class of title IX; thus, no
private right of action for employees). Should title X be found to reach employ-
ment practices, a conflict may arise between a plaintiff's immediate access to the
courts under title IX and the broad range of administrative and procedural re-
quirements imposed on those who file complaints under title VII or the Equal Pay
Act. See generally 29 C.F.R. § 1601 (1979); 29 C.F.R. § 800 (1979). Indeed,
it might be argued that this conflict supports the claim that Congress did not
intend to cover employment under title IX. Although Congress may have con-
sidered the ramifications of its employment coverage in the event that the courts
implied a private right of action, see Cannon, 441 U.S. at 703, it is the judiciary
which implies private rights of action, and it is also the judiciary which should
deal with the potential conflict. For example, courts can conclude that the explicit
policies represented by congressional enactment of title VII and the Equal Pay
Act are controlling, and therefore, no private actions under title IX are possible
for employee-related discrimination. Alternatively, a title VII or Equal Pay Act
exhaustion requirement could be imposed on potential plaintiffs, or the courts can
simply consider the title IX sanction another overlapping remedy. See note 134
infra. At most, now that a private right of action has been inferred for at least
one class of plaintiffs, Congress may want to amend title IX, limiting private suits
to those alleged victims of sex discrimination who do not have recourse to title
VII or the Equal Pay Act. In any case, these individual remedies, however
framed, are not sufficient to fulfill the primary congressional motive behind title IX.
See note 134 infra and text accompanying note 133 infra.
123 Cannon, 441 U.S. at 704 (footnote omitted).
12442 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1976).
2229 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1976). Because the Equal Pay Act is limited to
wage discrimination, it "does not provide a vehicle for moving women into non-
traditional jobs, nor does it address the need to upgrade the status and pay of
jobs traditionally held by women." Greenberger, The Effectiveness of Federal
Laws Prohibiting Sex Discrimination in Employment in the United States, in
EQUAL EIPLOYMENT PoucY FOR WorNOr 108, 118 (R. Ratner ed. 1980). The
Act thus cannot solve the problem of sex stereotyping in our educational systems.
See notes 108-10 supra & accompanying text.
12642 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1976) (tide VII); Reorg. Plan No. 1 of 1978, 3
C.F.R. 321 (1978 Compilation), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. app., at 354 (Supp. III
1979) (Equal Pay Act). The EEOC has not been aggressive in enforcing title VII
or the Equal Pay Act against sex-related discrimination, primarily due to an insuf-
ficient budget, inadequate staffing, and administrative ineptitude. See Greenberger,
supra note 125, at 111, 118.
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against the employer.127  The EEOC has no authority under title
VII or the Equal Pay Act, however, to seek the termination of any
federal funds that the institution might be receiving. Thus, the
remedies allowed under these laws, even the broad injunctive and
affirmative relief allowed under title VII,128 provide little incentive
for educational institutions to voluntarily eliminate all employment
practices that discriminate on the basis of sex.
129
Executive Order Number 11,246,130 on the other hand, does
accomplish some aspects of the title IX sanction. The order re-
quires that all recipients of federal contracts submit to an affirmative
action plan if one is needed to remedy past discrimination; 131 the
relevant agency can cancel all government contracts and eliminate
future bidding rights if the contractor does not comply. The De-
partment of Labor's Office of Federal Contract Compliance Pro-
grams can administer these sanctions against colleges and universities.
The order, however, applies only to those institutions that are
government contractors, 132 a category that rarely, if ever, includes
elementary and secondary schools or other types of educational
institutions covered under title IX. Executive Order Number
12729 U.S.C. §§211(a), 216(b) (1976 & Supp. III 1979) (Equal Pay Act);
49 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1976) (title VII).
Under the Equal Pay Act, the EEOC may conduct compliance investigations
without a prior complaint. Moreover, individual employees may sue their em-
ployers directly for alleged wage discrimination. Under title VII, however, an
individual wishing to sue his or her employer must first file a complaint with the
EEOC. If the EEOC fails to act within a specified time period, the individual
may obtain a "right to sue letter" from the agency, and proceed to sue the em-
ployer directly. If the plaintiff wins, the discriminating employer may be re-
quired to bear the costs of the suit, including the plaintiff's attorney's fees. Private
individuals and groups, however, often lack the financial resources to initiate direct
suits, and many attorneys are reluctant to handle employment discrimination suits
against employers. Moreover, harassment of many complainants discourages pri-
vate suits. See Greenberger, supra note 125, at 108, 111-13.
128 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1976).
129 There are no penalties available under title VII or the Equal Pay Act.
The Equal Pay Act does provide for liquidated damages equal to the amount of
back pay. See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (Supp. III 1979). Even an employer who
expects to lose, therefore, benefits by waiting to be sued because he or she
has the use of the funds required to change a discriminatory practice or pay any
back wages due. See generally Greenberger, supra note 125, at 110-11, 118.
130 See note 118 supra.
131 To the extent that affirmative action is required, the executive order goes
beyond title IX.
32 The percentage of the 3,100 colleges and universities covered by title IX,
see NATIONAL CENTER ON EDUCATION STATISTICS, EDUCATION DECTORY, COLLEGES
& UNrvmnsrryEs xx-cviii (1978-79), that falls within the mandate of the executive
order, is not readily ascertainable. It is likely, however, that most of the two-year
institutions (approximately 1,200) and some of the remaining four-year institutions
are not government contractors.
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11,246 thus is not sufficiently broad in its coverage to meet the
goal of eliminating sex discrimination in educational institutions.
In enacting title IX, Congress hoped to fill the void left in the
education area by the "important, but usually piecemeal, sanc-
tions" 133 provided by title VII, the Equal Pay Act, and Executive
Order Number 11,246.134 Society's goal of eradicating sex discrimi-
nation-and thus sex stereotyping-from the nation's educational
institutions can be achieved only if the government has the ultimate
power to terminate the education funds available to a discriminatory
institution. The Fifth Circuit has explained the need for this more
forceful approach in discussing title VI and the problem of school
desegregation:
Congress was dissatisfied with the slow process inherent in
the judicial adversary process. Congress therefore fash-
ioned a new method of enforcement to be administered
not on a case by case basis as in the courts but generally,
by federal agencies operating on a national scale and hav-
ing a special competence in their respective fields. Con-
gress looked to these agencies to shoulder the additional
enforcement burdens resulting from the shift to high
gear .... 135
Termination of educational funds for violations of title IX is,
of course, a drastic sanction. Congress thus provided that it be a
sanction of last resort; 131 the primary enforcement method of title
IX is voluntary compliance. The statute permits use of the termi-
nation sanction only if "compliance cannot be secured by voluntary
means." 137 Moreover, many layers of procedural safeguards protect
1 North Haven Bd. of Educ., 629 F.2d at 785.
134 Even If these alternative remedies were more appropriately designed to
achieve the stated congressional purpose, title LX could still be used to remedy
employment discrimination. The Supreme Court has consistently recognized that
"legislative enactfients in this area have long evinced a general intent to accord
parallel or overlapping remedies against discrimination." Alexander v. Gardner-
Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 47 (1974); accord, Johnson v. Railway Express Agency,
Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 459 (1975). See North Haven Bd. of Educ., 629 F.2d at
784-85. On the general ineffectiveness of title VII and the Equal Pay Act, see
Greenberger, supra note 125.
185 United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836, 853 (5th
Cir. 1966) (footnote omitted), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 840 (1967).
136 Cannon, 441 U.S. at 705 & n.38; id. 719-20 (White, J., dissenting). Sena-
tor Bayh suggested that ED "would be reasonable and would use only such leverage
as was necessary against the institution. .. . [T]he Secretary would be expected
to use good judgment as to how much leverage to apply, and where it could
best be applied." 117 CoNG. R c. 30408 (1971).
13720 U.S.C. § 1682 (1976).
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the alleged discriminatory institution. ED's regulations had to be
issued in proposed form, subjected to public comments, redrafted
by ED, reissued in final form, approved by the President, and re-
viewed by the Congress before they could bccome effective. 138 The
regulations require that each institution establish appropriate self-
evaluation and grievance procedures. 139 Should ED not be able to
secure voluntary compliance through a negotiated settlement, it
must make an express finding, after giving the institution an op-
portunity for a hearing, that the institution failed to comply with
title IX.14o Thereafter, ED must file a full report with the relevant
House and Senate committees, and thirty days must pass without
any formal action by the Congress. 141 Finally, the statute explicitly
provides for judicial review of any action taken by ED.142 Title IX
was enacted, therefore, not as a punitive measure, but as a lever
to be used against discriminatory educational institutions. Institu-
tions that discriminate on the basis of sex are threatened with a
cutoff of federal funds unless appropriate changes are made. In-
deed, it is this potential threat that makes title IX so different from,
yet so complementary to, the alternative remedies available for
employment discrimination.
B. Contrasting Political Climates: Title VI and Title IX
Opponents of title IX employment coverage argue that, be-
cause title VI provides for a fund cutoff sanction but clearly does
not reach employment, 143 Congress cannot be said to consider such
a sanction necessary for eliminating employment discrimination.
Race-based employment discrimination is as invidious as sex dis-
crimination, and it too needs the forceful sanction that a potential
cutoff of funds provides. Two explanations account for this seem-
ing contradiction. First, as previously discussed, -44 title IX- unlike
title VI-is limited to educational programs, an area in which em-
ployment discrimination is especially harmful.145  Second, the
138 See notes 9-11 supra & accompanying text.
139 34 C.F.R. §§ 106.3(c)-3(d), 106.8(b) (1980).
14020 U.S.C. § 1682 (1976).
141 Id.
142 20 U.S.C. § 1683 (1976). For a summary discussion of these safeguards,
see Hunter, Federal Antibias Legislation and Academic Freedom: Some Problems
With Enforcement Procedures, 27 EMoRY L.J. 609, 615-16 (1978).
143 See notes 49-57 supra & accompanying text.
144 See notes 108-10 supra & accompanying text.
145 It can also be argued that educational programs are distinct from other
federally funded programs because such large amounts of federal funds are ex-
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political situation in 1964 required that an employment exemp-
tion 141 be added to title VI in order to end a Senate filibuster,
whereas no such compromise was necessary in 1972.147
When trying to explain the absence of an employment exemp-
tion in title IX, opponents of ED's employment coverage have
suggested that title VI was not intended to cover employment even
without its employment exemption. They assert that the exemp-
tion was added to title VI for clarification purposes only.148 This
reading of title VI's legislative history, however, is shortsighted.
The employment exemption in title VI was amended onto the
statute as part of a substitute written during informal bargaining
between the Senate's Democratic and Republican leadership with
the intention of providing a compromise that would garner enough
votes to end the ongoing filibuster.149 Because title VI was brought
directly to the Senate floor after it passed the House, no exhaustive
committee reports explaining its provisions exist.150 Senator Hum-
phrey, however, as majority whip and floor manager of the bill,
pended on salaries and other expenses relating to the employees of educational
institutions. For example, many federal research grants go directly to employees.
Most courts have already recognized title IX coverage for recipients of these
funds. See note 28 supra. The Second Circuit noted that the North Haven school
board uses between 46.8% and 66.9% of its federal funds to pay salaries of its
employees, North Haven Bd. of Educ., 629 F.2d at 774-75, although no special
significance was explicitly attached to this fact. The Fifth Circuit noted in
Dougherty County School Sys. v. Harris that a substantial portion of the federal aid
received by the school went toward salaries of home economics and vocational
education teachers. 622 F.2d 735, 738 (5th Cir. 1980). This evidence led that
court to conclude that more limited regulations prohibiting sex discrimination
among employees who have a specific relationship to federal educational funds or
programs may be authorized by title IX. Id. 737-38. See notes 19-20 supra &
accompanying text. There is no evidence, however, that Congress distinguished
between education and other federally funded programs on the basis of their
dependence on federal monies; nor is there any suggestion in the legislative history
that employees can be differentiated according to their connections with federal
funds.
146 See note 46 supra.
347 See notes 149, 152-54 infra & accompanying text. Cf. United Steelworkers
v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 206 (1979) ("Title VII could not have been enacted
into law without substantial support from legislators in both Houses who tradi-
tionally resisted federal regulation of private business. Those legislators demanded
[a compromise] as a price for their support....").
148 See note 57 supra.
149 The Mansfield-Dirksen substitute was introduced on May 26, 1964. 110
CoNG. REc. 11926 (1964). Cloture of the filibuster was voted on June 10, 1964.
110 CoNG. REc. 13327 (1964). The Civil Bights Act passed the Senate on June
19, 110 CONG. Rlc. 14511 (1964), passed the House on July 2, 110 CoNG. REc.
15897 (1964), and was signed by the President on the same day. Civil Rights Act
of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-2000h
(1976)).
150 2 STATuroRY -hsToRy OF THE UNITED STArEs: Crim Ricnrs 1089-90 (B.
Schwartz ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited as Schwartz].
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provided his colleagues with detailed analyses of the bill before
and after the substitute was introduced. Comparing these two sum-
maries demonstrates that the employment exemption did result in
substantive changes to title VI's coverage.151
Congress in 1972 was confronted with a completely different
political situation. Many enactments prohibiting sex discrimina-
tion were easily passed during that year.15 2 Title IX itself was
passed in the Senate by a voice vote.153 The only amendments
made to title IX concerned limited exceptions to its coverage; 154
in contrast to the situation in 1964, no further compromise was
necessary. A majority of Congress was concerned primarily with
eliminating sex discrimination with as few limitations as possible.
In such an atmosphere, it is difficult to imagine that Congress did
not intend to cover employment discrimination under title IX.
C. The "Innocent Victims" of Title IX
Section 1682 of title IX allows ED only two courses of action
when it finds sex discrimination in a recipient educational institu-
151 After the Mansfield-Dirksen substitute was introduced, Senator Humphrey
noted that the employment exemption "serves to spell out more precisely the de-
clared scope of coverage of the title." 110 CONG. REc. 12720 (1964). This lan-
guage suggests that no substantive changes were made in title VI. Before the
employment exemption existed, however, Senator Humphrey had this to say about
title VI's employment coverage:
In such cases the Commissioner [of Education] might also be justi-
fied in requiring elimination of racial discrimination in employment or
assignment of teachers, at least where such discrimination affected the
educational opportunities of students ....
This does not mean that title VI would authorize a Federal official
to prescribe pupil assignments, or to select a faculty, as opponents of the
bill have suggested. The only authority conferred would be authority to
adopt, with the approval of the President, a general requirement that the
local school authority refrain from racial discrimination in treatment of
pupils and teachers and authority to achieve compliance with that require-
ment by cutoff of funds or by other means authorized by law.
110 CoNG. BEc. 6545 (1964) (emphasis added). The legislative history thus in-
dicates that the addition of an employment exemption to title VI did have a
substantive effect on the title's reach. Other summaries of the changes made by
the Mansfield-Dirksen substitute conform to this analysis. See, e.g., 110 CONG.
REc. 14220 (1964) (statement by Senator Holland) ("Substantive changes are
made in [the section adding the employment exemption].").
A more detailed examination of title VI's legislative history is beyond the
scope of this Comment. See generally Schwartz, supra note 150.
152 For example, the final version of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act
of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (codified in scattered sections of 5, 42
U.S.C.), passed the Senate by a vote of 62 to 10, 118 CONG. REc. 7170 (1972),
and the House by a vote of 303 to 110, 118 CONG. BEc. 7572-73 (1972).
153 118 CONG. EeC. 5815 (1972).
1
5 4 See note 32 supra.
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tion.1r5 ED must either seek to terminate the federal funds of the
discriminatory program by complying with all the procedural re-
quirements necessary for such a cutoff,156 or use "any other means
authorized by law," including a referral of the case to the Justice
Department for proceedings to enforce federal law or government
contracts with nondiscrimination provisions.15 7 These limited en-
forcement provisions have led most courts to conclude that the
termination of federal funds, and thus the application of title IX,
is justified only when the students are themselves the victims of
sex discrimination. 58  In such a case, the benefits that "students
might derive from the education programs financed by [ED are]
more than outweighed by the sex discrimination in those pro-
grams." 159 A termination of funds in a case in which only em-
ployees are victims of discrimination, on the other hand, would
hurt innocent students by eliminating their educational programs
when there has been no violation of their rights. Moreover, a
fund cutoff would undoubtedly lead to the layoff of teachers and
other staff.160 Because it is unlikely that Congress would support
an enforcement mechanism that injures the primary beneficiaries
of federal educational programs, without enforcing their rights, the
argument continues, Congress could not have intended to cover
employment discrimination under title IX.161
This seemingly logical argument, however, is in several respects
inaccurate and inconsistent. It assumes a narrow and unrealistic
view of the innocent victims of any fund cutoff. Given a finding
of student-related discrimination, a termination of funds is the
ultimate sanction. Such a sanction applies to the entire institution
or program involved, thereby cutting off funds even with respect
to students who are not being discriminated against.16 2 Thus, some
155 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1976).
156 See text accompanying notes 140-41 supra.
157 34 C.F.R. § 106.91 (1980) (interim procedures incorporating 34 C.F.R.
§ 100.8(a) (1980)). See Cannon, 441 U.S. at 722 & n.9 (White, J., dissenting).
158 See, e.g., Junior College Dist. v. Califano, 455 F. Supp. 1212, 1214-15 (E.D.
Mo. 1978), aff'd, 597 F.2d 119 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979);
Romeo Community Schools v. HEW, 438 F. Supp. 1021, 1032-33 (E.D. Mich.
1977), aff'd, 600 F.2d 581 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979).
159 Romeo Community Schools v. HEW, 438 F. Supp. 1021, 1032 (E.D. Mich.
1977), aff'd, 600 F.2d 581 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979).
160 Seattle Univ. v. HEW, 16 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 719, 721 (W.D. Wash.
1978), aff'd per curiam, 621 F.2d 992 (9th Cir.), cert. granted sub nom. United
States Dep't of Educ. v. Seattle Univ., 49 U.S.L.W. 3409 (U.S. Dec. 1, 1980)
(No. 80-493).
161 See cases cited in notes 158-60 supra.
162 North Haven Bd. of Educ., 629 F.2d at 785.
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students will be the innocent victims of a sanction imposed due to
student-related discrimination. Moreover, such a cutoff of funds
will hurt the staff involved in the programs. Unless these em-
ployees are responsible for the student-related discrimination, they
too will be innocent victims.
The potential cutoff of funds after a finding of employee-
related discrimination leads to analogous results. In that case, a
fund cutoff likely will affect both victim-employees and uninvolved
employees and have an adverse impact on innocent students.
Just as cutoffs caused by employee-related discrimination may
hurt uninvolved employees and innocent students, cutoffs caused by
student-related discrimination will hurt uninvolved students and
innocent employees. 6 3
That both of these situations may appear undesirable should
not concern the courts. Congress has decided that the benefits
students may obtain from programs in which there is sex discrimi-
nation are sufficiently outweighed by the social costs of such dis-
crimination. Thus, federal funds must be cut off, even if innocent
students may be injured in the process.'" This analysis applies
equally to the problem of employment discrimination in these
programs. Employee-related gender-based discrimination injures
students as much as discrimination directed solely at students. The
congressional prohibition of sex discrimination expressed in title
IX "15 therefore requires that both types of funding cutoffs be per-
mitted if complete elimination of sex discrimination in educational
programs is to be achieved.
In practical terms, federal funds are rarely terminated because
many procedural safeguards protect the alleged violators of title
IX' 6 and because the funding cutoff is a sanction of last resort,
used primarily as leverage against the discriminating institution 6 7
There is little opportunity, therefore, for the so-called innocent
victim problem to arise.
163 The only argument distinguishing these two cases is that some of the em-
ployees may be responsible for the student-related discrimination, while it is un-
likely that any students will be responsible for employee-related discrimination.
But it is unlikely that Congress intended that its policy be interpreted based upon
such a fine distinction.
164 See, e.g., Romeo Community Schools v. HEW, 438 F. Supp. 1021, 1032
(E.D. Mich. 1977), aff'd, 600 F.2d 581 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 972
(1979).
165 See text accompanying note 23 supra.
166 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1976). See notes 137-42 supra & accompanying text.
167 See note 136 supra & accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION
Until recently, the government's use of title IX to prohibit
gender-based employment discrimination seemed to be coming to
an undesirable halt. With the recent opinions of the Second and
Fifth Circuits, however, new momentum has gathered in support
of such employment coverage, and the Supreme Court recently
granted certiorari in United States Department of Education v.
Seattle University 108 to decide the issue. Unfortunately, none of
the lower courts considering the scope of title IX have examined
adequately the purposes underlying the enactment of the statute.
Rather, they have come to differing conclusions by disagreeing over
interpretations of the language and legislative history of title IX.
This Comment has shown that both of these traditional indicia
of legislative intent are ambiguous and inconclusive. The con-
gressional motives behind the enactment of title IX, on the other
hand, are far from unclear. Congress was particularly concerned
about the adverse impact that employment discrimination has in
an educational setting. The powerful threat of a fund termination,
supplemented by whatever individual remedies are available, is
the only way that sex discrimination and its detrimental effects can
be completely eliminated from our educational systems. Only
title IX can provide such an effective sanction. The statute should
therefore be held to cover employment discrimination and the
ED regulations found valid and enforceable.
16849 U.S.L.W. 3409 (U.S. Dec. 1, 1980) (No. 80-493).
After this Comment went to press, petitions for certiorari were filed in North
Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Hufstedler, 629 F.2d 773 (2d Cir. 1980), petition for
cert. filed, 49 U.S.L.W. 3467 (U.S. Dec. 16, 1980) (No. 80-987) and Dougherty
County School Sys. v. Harris, 622 F.2d 735 (5th Cir. 1980), petition for cert. filed
sub nom. Hufstedler v. Dougherty County School Sys., 49 U.S.L.W. 3495 (U.S.
Dec. 22, 1980) (No. 80-1023).
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